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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 








CITY OF GREENSBURG; BOROUGH OF SOUTHWEST GREENSBURG;  
BOROUGH OF SOUTH GREENSBURG; OFFICER SHAWN DENNING;  
SERGEANT JASON GAIN; SERGEANT BRYAN PAINTER;  
OFFICER ROBERT SHAPIRO; LIEUTENANT W. ROBERT JONES;  
SERGEANT DONALD COLE; LIEUTENANT KRISTOPHER CHAPPELL;  












CITY OF GREENSBURG; BOROUGH OF SOUTHWEST GREENSBURG;  
BOROUGH OF SOUTH GREENSBURG; OFFICER SHAWN DENNING;  
SERGEANT JASON GAIN; SERGEANT BRYAN PAINTER;  
OFFICER ROBERT SHAPIRO; LIEUTENANT W. ROBERT JONES;  
SERGEANT DONALD COLE; LIEUTENANT KRISTOPHER CHAPPELL;  
SERGEANT HENRY FONTANA, JR. 
 
                                             Bryan Painter, 








On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil No. 2-17-cv-00330) 
District Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan  
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1 
on November 13, 2020 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 








SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
Kevin Waugaman accuses two of the officers at the scene of his March 2015 arrest, 
including Sergeant Bryan Painter, of kicking or stomping on him after he was placed in 
handcuffs.  Painter argues that Waugaman had no tenable basis for this claim and filed a 
motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  For the reasons discussed below, we will 
affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment with respect to Waugaman’s 
excessive force claim against Painter and the order denying Painter’s motion for sanctions.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





 Painter was one of the responding officers when Waugaman entered a vacant 
residence on March 17, 2015.1  Officer Shawn Denning handcuffed Waugaman, but once 
outside Waugaman ran down the street away from the officers.  Denning and Painter 
pursued Waugaman, Denning caught Waugaman, and the two collided with a parked car—
sending Waugaman’s head through a window.  Waugaman alleges that Denning 
intentionally or recklessly targeted Waugaman’s head into the car window.  Painter then 
placed his knee against Waugaman’s buttocks to keep him on the ground and called for an 
ambulance.   
During the time between hitting the car window and the arrival of paramedics, 
Waugaman asserts he was kicked or stomped on by one or more, but not all, of the police 
officers at the scene.  He alleges Painter was one of the officers who assaulted him.  
However, no evidence in the record, including Waugaman’s own deposition, identifies 
Painter as an officer who kicked or stomped on Waugaman.  Bleeding from hitting the car 
window, Waugaman contends the blood in his face obscured his ability to identify the 
officers.  Waugaman also alleges other officers observed the assault but did nothing to 
intervene.   
 Waugaman filed suit on March 14, 2017 against Officers Jason Gain, Nicholas 
Rullo, and Shawn Denning, fourteen John Doe officers, and the three towns that 
employed the various officers.  In the Second Amended Complaint, Waugaman dropped 
 




Rullo from the lawsuit and identified the John Doe officers as Painter, Kristopher 
Chappell, Donald Cole, Henry Fontana Jr., W. Robert Jones, and Robert Shapiro.  
Painter’s attempt to dismiss the lawsuit based on the statute of limitations was denied and 
Painter did not file an answer.  Waugaman eventually agreed to dismiss Chappell, 
Fontana, and one of the towns from the lawsuit. 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on September 17, 2018.  After 
Painter’s city of employment, Borough of South Greensburg, was dismissed from the suit, 
he filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.  In May 2019 all remaining parties consented to 
the Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction.  The District Court granted summary judgment for all 
defendants except Denning on June 7, 2019.  The Rule 11 motion was denied on June 18, 
2019.  Judgment was entered on November 18, 2019 following settlement with, and the 
dismissal of, defendants other than Painter in October.  This appeal and cross-appeal 
followed.2  
 
2  The District Court had jurisdiction over the alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a).  The District Court also had jurisdiction over state tort 
law claims through supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  We have 





 Waugaman fails to identify evidence that would establish a genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding allegations that Painter kicked or stomped on Waugaman.  Our 
precedent requires that “in the face of motion for summary judgment, a § 1983 plaintiff 
must produce evidence supporting each individual defendant’s personal involvement in the 
alleged violation to bring that defendant to trial.”  Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 
280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 
2020) (“Jutrowski’s central tenet—that a defendant’s § 1983 liability must be predicated 
on his direct and personal involvement in the alleged violation—is manifest in our 
excessive force jurisprudence.”) (quotations omitted). 
Waugaman argues the court erred by not properly crediting his claim that he was 
kicked and/or stomped on by some of the officers at the scene.  Assuming as true for the 
purposes of summary judgment that some officers assaulted Waugaman, there is no 
evidence in the record identifying Painter as an assailant.4  Painter denies he kicked 
Waugaman.  No officer on the scene saw Painter kick Waugaman.  No neighborhood 
 
3  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment decision and 
review conclusions of law de novo.  Sikora v. UPMC, 876 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party 
fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to 
which she has the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
4  Waugaman also objects to the District Court’s rejection of his expert, who indicated the 
blood marks on Waugaman’s clothing were consistent with being kicked.  The rejection 




witness saw Painter kick Waugaman.  And Waugaman himself stated he could not identify 
any officer involved in kicking him.   
Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that Painter kicked Waugaman 
cannot be relied upon by Waugaman to overcome summary judgment.  Saldana v. Kmart 
Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The party opposing summary judgment may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading; its response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.” (quotations omitted)).  Because there is nothing in the record, 
outside of the pleadings, that shows Painter assaulted Waugaman, there is no genuine 
dispute of fact related to Painter’s personal involvement in the assault.5 
 Given this lack of genuine dispute, Waugaman contends—for the first time in his 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment—Painter should instead be held 
responsible for a failure to intervene.  Waugaman asserts it does not matter whether Painter 
actually kicked Waugaman.  Instead, Waugaman urges that Painter is liable because even 
if he did not assault Waugaman himself, Painter failed to intervene and stop the assault.   
The court rejected this argument because the Second Amended Complaint alleged 
only that Painter kicked Waugaman, not that Painter failed to intervene.  The Second 
Amended Complaint instead identified five separate officers who failed to intervene.6  It is 
 
5  The inability to identify any evidence showing Painter was an assailant also fails to 
establish a genuine dispute of material fact for Waugaman’s state law tort claims. 
6  All five of these identified officers that allegedly failed to intervene were eventually 
dismissed from the case.  The City of Greensburg and Officers Shawn Denning and 




commonly accepted that a “plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in 
his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”  Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 
82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1996).  Waugaman did not file a motion for leave to amend his 
complaint, and the court’s rejection of the de facto attempt to do so in the summary 
judgment briefings was not an abuse of discretion because it was in line with the general 
rule barring this type of amendment.  See Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.”). 
To the extent Waugaman relies on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Fazica v. Jordan, 
926 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2019) to support his failure to intervene claim—despite the failure 
to plead it—that case is not inconsistent with the District Court’s ruling.  In Fazica, the 
Sixth Circuit allowed a case to move forward with failure to intervene claims even though 
the plaintiff could not attribute particular actions to individual officers and did not 
specifically allege failure to intervene.  926 F.3d at 288–90; see generally Amended 
Compl., Fazica v. Jordan, 2018 WL 1410807 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2018) (No. 16-cv-
13563), ECF No. 7.  In contrast to Waugaman’s allegations, the Fazica plaintiff alleged 
that all defendant officers engaged in “acts or omissions” that violated plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.  Amended Compl. ¶¶ 14–15, Fazica v. Jordan, 926 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 
2019) (No. 16-cv-13563), ECF No. 7.  She also alleged that each individual officer 
assaulted her and acted in concert with each other.  Id.  ¶¶ 21, 30.   
Accordingly, in situations where a plaintiff cannot allocate responsibility for 
individual actions among specifically identified defendants, the Sixth Circuit considers 




against [plaintiff] or by observing others doing so and failing to act.”  Fazica, 926 F.3d at 
290; accord El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2020) (construing an 
excessive force claim against three officers as a failure to intervene claim against the officer 
that did not use force).  But Waugaman did allocate responsibility among the defendants 
in his Second Amended Complaint.  He specifically alleged failure to intervene against 
five officers other than Painter7 and separately alleged specific actions of excessive force 
against Painter.  He cannot change his complaint now. 
Finally, Waugaman’s arguments regarding joint and severable liability are 
unavailing.  For joint and several liability to apply, three requirements must be met: “1) all 
defendants must have acted tortiously; 2) the plaintiff must have been harmed by the 
conduct of at least one of the defendants, and therefore plaintiff must bring all possible 
defendants before the court; and 3) the plaintiff must be unable to identify which defendant 
caused the injury.”  New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Because Waugaman has failed to adduce evidence that Painter’s conduct was 
tortious or unconstitutional in the first place, joint and several liability is inapplicable.    
 
7  As noted supra note 6, Waugaman voluntarily agreed to dismiss or settle with the five 





 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Painter’s motion for 
sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  Rule 11 requires a party presenting a pleading before 
the court by “submitting, or later advocating it” to certify after a reasonable inquiry that “it 
is not being presented for any improper purpose[;]” the claims and legal contentions “are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument[;]” “the factual contentions have 
evidentiary support” or “will likely have evidentiary support after” discovery; and “denials 
of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or . . . are reasonably based on belief 
or a lack of information.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).  Courts apply “an objective standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances” to Rule 11’s requirements.  Mary Ann Pensiero, 
Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988).  But the “wisdom of hindsight should be 
avoided,” id., and “the Rule must not be used as an automatic penalty against an attorney . 
. . advocating the losing side of a dispute” nor used “as a general fee shifting device.”   
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482–83 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
8  We review the District Court’s Rule 11(c) decision for abuse of discretion.  Moeck v. 
Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 844 F.3d 387, 389–90 (3d Cir. 2016).  Therefore, “we 
evaluate the court’s factual determinations, legal conclusions, and choice of an 
appropriate sanction with substantial deference, considering not whether we would 
make the same precise determinations, but only whether those determinations are 
contrary to reason or without a reasonable basis in law and fact.”  Id. (quotations 
omitted).  “An example of abuse of discretion occurs when a district court base[s] its 
ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence.”  Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of 





 The court concluded sanctions were not warranted because Waugaman recalled 
being kicked by two men and learned before filing the Second Amended Complaint that 
Painter had physical contact with him when Painter placed his knee on Waugaman’s 
buttocks.  Accordingly, Waugaman “could reasonably believe that Officer Painter could 
be one of the kickers because not many officers had physical contact with him.”  We find 
no error or abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that this was a reasonable 
determination for Waugaman and his attorneys to make. 
 Painter objects because the court focused its analysis on what was known at the time 
of the filing of the complaint and did not credit his argument that Waugaman’s position 
later became untenable.  While it is true that after a complaint is filed you can subject 
yourself to sanctions if you persist in advocating a legally untenable position, Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; Turner v. Sungard Bus. Sys., Inc., 
91 F.3d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1996), we must give “substantial deference” to the trial court 
in these matters, Moeck, 844 F.3d at 390.  The court’s conclusion that sanctions were not 
warranted is not “contrary to reason or without a reasonable basis in law and fact.”  Moeck, 
844 F.3d at 390. 
 Even though it became clear after discovery that no one could personally identify 
Painter as having kicked or stomped on Waugaman, the opposition to summary judgment 
and briefing on appeal make it clear Waugaman believed his claims against Painter could 
be construed in the alternative as a failure to intervene claim.  While Waugaman was not 
successful in his arguments, those arguments were not patently unmeritorious or frivolous.  




circumstance where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous.” (quotations 
omitted)).  Therefore, we hold that it was not erroneous to find sanctions unwarranted. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders granting 
summary judgment on the excessive force claim and dismissing the motion for Rule 11 
sanctions. 
